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 1 Introduction
Since the early 1990s, an increasing number of central banks have adopted an inﬂation-targeting
framework, in which explicit inﬂation objectives have been set up. A substantial body of existing
literature has already investigated the macroeconomic eﬀects of the inﬂation-targeting policy, both
theoretically and empirically, and has documented that it has contributed to an array of favorable
macroeconomic outcomes such as the emergence of the low and stable inﬂation environment in
recent decades. See Svensson (1999, 2000), Bernanke et al. (1999), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel
(2001) and contributions in Bernanke and Woodford (2005), among others.
Yet it is not entirely clear how these favorable outcomes have been achieved. If the introduction
of an explicit quantitative target, geared with a high degree of transparency and accountability,
ﬁrmly anchors inﬂation expectations, the central bank can deliver low and stable inﬂation even
without changing its interest rate setting.1 On the other hand, if the adoption of the inﬂation-
targeting framework reﬂects a change in the preference of the central bank, it may lead to greater
responsiveness in the interest rate setting to inﬂation.
Some researchers have tried to tackle this question by estimating how the responsiveness of the
interest rate to inﬂation changed in inﬂation-targeting countries. For example, Neumann and von
Hagen (2002) and Kuttner and Posen (1999) estimate variants of Taylor rules for inﬂation-targeting
countries that are covered in this paper. Their split sample estimations broadly suggest greater
sensitivity of the interest rate to inﬂation after the adoption of inﬂation targeting. Cecchetti and
Ehrmann (1999) identify the implied weight attached to inﬂation variability in a central bank’s loss
function. Most of the nine inﬂation-targeting central banks they examined exhibited increases in
their revealed aversion to inﬂation variability after the adoption of inﬂation targeting.
In comparison with these existing studies, this paper makes the following contributions. First,
we estimate monetary policy activism by applying a time-varying parameter with stochastic volatil-
ity (TVP-SV) model, which is used by Cogley and Sargent (2005) to uncover the evolution of the
Fed policy stance. This enables us to see more precisely the timing of changes in the activism in-
1Johnson (2002, 2003), Levin et al. (2004) and G¨ urkayanak et al. (2006) show that inﬂation expectations have
become more ﬁrmly anchored in inﬂation-targeting countries.
1dicator, which may not necessarily be captured by the split sample estimation used in the existing
literature. We ﬁnd that, somewhat in line with the rolling regression results of Muscatelli et al.
(2002), activism appears to have increased before (not after) the adoption of the inﬂation-targeting
policy framework. Moreover, with the beneﬁt of posttarget data, we also ﬁnd that the activism
indicator declined recently, although the extent of decline in the activism indicators varies across
countries.
The second contribution of this paper is that, by developing a formal theoretical model within
a New Keynesian framework, we show that the recent fall in activism can be seen as a less binding
constraint of an inﬂation target range. The countries with superior inﬂation records were in a
situation where they did not have to react to inﬂation very aggressively. On the other hand,
countries with less favorable inﬂation records need to maintain high levels of activism to keep
inﬂation within the desired range.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 deﬁnes monetary policy activism as the
coeﬃcients of a Taylor-type rule and shows how to estimate them within a TVP-SV model. Section
3 documents the estimation results. Section 4 develops a theoretical model of the optimal monetary
policy with an inﬂation target range. Section 5 discusses possible reasons why activism in some
countries declined more than in other countries. Section 6 concludes the paper. Two appendices
outline a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm used for estimating the TVP-SV model
and derivations of the optimal interest rate rules.
2 Analytical Framework
2.1 Monetary policy activism
To see the changing behaviors of central banks, we estimate the following hybrid Taylor rule with
interest rate smoothing:
it = β0t + β1tEtπt+1 + β2tπt + β3tEtxt+1 + β4txt + β5tit−1 + β6tit−2 + ϵt, (1)
2where it is the policy interest rate at time period t, πt is the inﬂation rate, xt is the output gap, and
ϵt is an error term. Etπt+1 and Etxt+1 are the expected rate of inﬂation and the expected output
gap, respectively. Monetary policy activism is gauged by the cumulative response to both expected
and actual inﬂation rates, (β1t + β2t)/(1 − β5t − β6t). It may also depend on the response to the
output gap, β3t and β4t, but, following the existing literature, we focus on the response to inﬂation.
Given the well-known diﬃculty of measuring the output gap, it would be more challenging to pin
down the time variance of responsiveness to the output gap.
Equation (1) is a generalization of the policy reaction functions in the previous empirical litera-
ture. The central bank may react not only to expected inﬂation Etπt+1, but also to actual inﬂation
πt. In the literature, it is often the case that a reaction function includes either expected inﬂation
(Clarida et al. (2000); Cogley and Sargent (2005)) or actual inﬂation (Primiceri (2005); Sims and
Zha (2006)), but we retain both terms as there is no a priori reason to drop one of them.
Equation (1) can also be seen as an empirical correspondence of an optimal interest rate rule.
It can be expressed as:















3ψ∗φ4t+j + (1 − η1)(1 − η2)i∗, (2)
where ft ≡ κλπψη3πt+λxψη3(−βµxt+1+xt−(1−µ)xt−1), θ1 = η1+η2, and θ2 = −η1η2. We defer
details to the section below except for pointing out that in this optimal rule the interest rate is
determined by its own lags and the current and future inﬂation rates as well as the lagged, current
and future values of the output gap. Equation (1) covers all these ingredients except that the
expectation terms are truncated at one-quarter ahead and the lagged output gap is not included
speciﬁcally. In this setup, among other things, an increase in the weight on inﬂation in the central
bank’s loss function λπ raises monetary policy activism.2
As emphasized by Clarida et al. (1998), considerable caution may be required for interpreting
the behavior of non-G3 central banks especially before they introduced the inﬂation-targeting policy
framework. It is rather unrealistic to assume that these central banks had followed the interest
2However, we cannot claim so in the following estimation, as unlike Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999) and
Assenmacher-Wesche (2006), we will not attempt to identify structural parameters.
3rate rule speciﬁed by equation (2) at the time, as they used to use the exchange rate as a nominal
anchor or follow policy decisions of the neighboring dominant central banks. Nonetheless, it is
still interesting to gauge the policy activism in this setup, as this enables us to evaluate the past
interest rate through the lens of the current policy regime, that is, if the central banks had adopted
the current policy rule and had set the interest rate at historical values, what degree of monetary
policy activism would have been implied.
2.2 Time-varying parameter with stochastic-volatility model
In equation (1), we assume all the coeﬃcients are time varying as indicated by the time subscript
of each coeﬃcient. We allow permanent shifts in parameters such that βi,t = βi,t−1 + ut, where ut
is an iid error term. This, in principle, can capture both gradual and sudden shifts in parameters
depending on the size of error ut.3 As we do not exclude the possibility that the central bank has
gradually changed its behavior over time—as we will see below, before the central bank announced
an inﬂation target, there might have been a transition period during which it gradually increased
its focus on low and stable inﬂation—we prefer a time-varying parameter model to the regime-
switching model used by Sims and Zha (2006) and Assenmacher-Wesche (2006), although we agree
that it would be interesting to extend our analysis using their methodology for comparison.
In addition, we also assume time variance for the volatility of the error term ϵt such that ht+1 =
ht + ϑt, where ht is an unobserved log volatility and ϑt is another iid error term. Incorporation
of time-variant stochastic volatility reﬂects the recent argument that inappropriate omission of
heteroskedasticity can strongly bias statistical tests in favor of ﬁnding signiﬁcant shifts in coeﬃcients
(see Sims (2001) and Cogley and Sargent (2005)). In this light, it is more prudent to retain
stochastic volatility, especially when estimation points to its existence.4 However, at the same
time, this prevents us from using a more conventional classical approach, as we cannot derive an
analytical form of the likelihood function in the presence of stochastic volatility. For this reason,
3Whether a TVP-SV model can identify a sudden structural break of a parameter remains to be conﬁrmed by
a careful Monte Carlo experiment. However, we are reasonably conﬁdent about this, as estimation below detects a
sudden shift in the US Fed’s activism in the early 1980s, which is often found in the literature using various methods.
4Although we do not show details below, this is exactly the case for our estimation.
4we will rely on the Bayesian approach.
Combined with the transition processes of parameters and volatility, equation (1) can be rep-
resented by the following state space form of a time-varying parameter with stochastic volatility
(TVP-SV) model:
it = Ztβt + γeht/2εt, εt ∼ N(0,1), (3)
βt = βt−1 + ut, ut ∼ N(0,B−1), (4)
ht = ht−1 + ϑt, ϑt ∼ N(0,H−1), (5)
and initial values of state variables are:
β0 = 0 and u1 ∼ N(0,B−1
0 ), (6)
h0 = 0 and ϑ1 ∼ N(0,H−1
0 ). (7)
Zt is a vector of explanatory variables (Etπt+1,πt,Etxt+1,xt,...). βt is the corresponding vector
of unobserved time-varying parameters and ht is the unobserved log volatility. The model can
be estimated by the MCMC using an eﬃcient Gaussian smoother (de Jong and Shephard, 1995)
combined with approximation of a mixture of normal density (Kim et al., 1998). Appendix A
summarizes the main steps of the estimation procedure.
3 Empirical Findings
3.1 Baseline case
For empirical investigation, πt is calculated as the annualized quarterly inﬂation rate 4∆pt, where pt
is the quarterly average of headline CPI (in logarithms), and the output gap xt is derived from the
diﬀerence between log real GDP and its HP-ﬁltered trend. it is the money market interest rate. All
the data come from the OECD Economic Outlook database. The sample period is 1970Q1–2005Q4
5except for Germany (1970Q1–1998Q4)5 and New Zealand (1975Q1–2005Q4).
Following Cogley and Sargent (2005), expected values of inﬂation and the output gap are
obtained by preliminary running of a trivariate time-varying VAR comprising it, πt and xt. This
VAR estimation corresponds to the ﬁrst stage of two-stage least squares. The presumption is that
the current and lagged inﬂation rates, the output gap and the nominal interest rate are a key
information set for the central bank to make inﬂation projections, and time-varying coeﬃcients
(including that of a constant term) capture the eﬀects of any important omitted variables.
Figure 1 shows development of the activism indicators of the sample countries. Prior to exam-
ining the changes in inﬂation-targeting countries, we brieﬂy touch upon those of the G3. First, for
the US, consistent with the ﬁndings of a number of existing studies (Clarida et al. (2000), Cogley
and Sargent (2005), etc.), the activism indicator increased sharply toward 1980 when Chairman
Volcker took oﬃce, and thereafter remained at a high level. However, contrary to Clarida et al.
(2000), who claim that the cumulative response of the policy rate to inﬂation did not reach unity
before 1980, our estimates of it remain above unity, albeit by a very small margin. This observation
is consistent with Primiceri (2005), who also ﬁnds that this was the case even during the 1970s. For
Japan, the activism indicator also increased toward 1980 and remained about unity until 1990.6
The recent decline in activism seems to correspond to its running out of room to maneuver be-
cause of the constraint of the zero nominal interest rate ﬂoor. For Germany, the activism indicator
remained at a relatively high level even in the 1970s. This ﬁnding is consistent with Cecchetti et
al. (2002) and Assenmacher-Wesche (2006), who ﬁnd a higher preference of the Bundesbank for
inﬂation stabilization.
Turning to inﬂation-targeting countries, we ﬁnd considerable diversity in the development of
their activism indicators. This point is highlighted by Figure 2, where the corresponding activism
indicators in Figure 1 are redrawn so that zero may correspond to the timing of the adoption of
5The responsibility of the monetary policy decision was passed to the European Central Bank from 1999Q1.
6The low level of activism in Japan is in line with Muscatelli et al. (2002), who estimate it to be 0.72 using data
from 1970Q2 to 1999Q2. We suspect this may be related to the Bank of Japan’s reliance on quantitative measures in
the 1970s and 1980s including “window guidance” for direct lending by the central bank to private banks (Ito, 1992,
Ch.5). However, given that Clarida et al. (1998) estimate it to be more than 2 using data from 1979 to 1994, there
may be other reasons. Further investigation seems warranted, but is beyond the scope of this paper.
6Figure 1: Activism indicator

































Note: Posterior means and medians of activism indicator (β1t + β2t)/(1 − β5t − β6t) in equation
(1). Dotted lines indicate posterior interquartile ranges. USA (the United States); JPN
(Japan); DEU (Germany); GBR (the United Kingdom); CAN (Canada); SWE (Sweden);
AUS (Australia); and NZL (New Zealand).
7Figure 2: Activism indicator before and after the adoption of IT (Baseline)












Note: Activism indicators of inﬂation-targeting countries based on forecasts by the trivariate
VAR (corresponding to medians in Figure 1). Zero corresponds to the timing of the
adoption of the inﬂation-targeting policy framework: i.e., 1992Q4 (GBR), 1991Q1
(CAN), 1993Q1 (SWE), 1994Q3 (AUS) and 1990Q1 (NZL).
the inﬂation-targeting policy framework. From this, we draw two observations.
First, most countries experienced considerable increases in activism prior to the regime change.
These increases are particularly noticeable for the United Kingdom and New Zealand. Activism
in Australia increased by the end of the 1980s.7 An increase in Canada took place around 1980
when activism increased signiﬁcantly in the United States. Sweden shows remarkable stability in
activism at a relatively high level.
Second, after the adoption of inﬂation targeting, activism declined. Activism in the United
Kingdom started its declining trend in the 1990s and that of Canada dropped toward the turn of
the millennium. Australia’s activism started to fall even before its adoption of an inﬂation-targeting
7Bernanke et al. (1999) note that the precise timing of the Australian move to inﬂation targeting is particularly
diﬃcult to pin down. Although an oﬃcial announcement was ﬁrst made in September 1994 (the timing used in Figure
2), the Reserve Bank of Australia’s own view is that it has had an inﬂation target since early 1993.
8Table 1: Mean activism
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
from: 1971Q1 1980Q1 target 2000Q1 Diﬀerence between samples
to: 1979Q4 target−1 1999Q4 2005Q4 (2) − (1) (4) − (3)
United States 1.13 1.63 1.44 1.46 0.50∗∗ 0.01 (0.9%)
Japan 0.73 0.88 0.65 0.53 0.16∗∗ −0.12∗∗ (−18.0%)
Germany 1.76 1.78 1.56 ... 0.02 −0.22∗∗ ...
United Kingdom 0.96 1.85 1.95 1.62 0.89∗∗ −0.33∗∗ (−17.0%)
Canada 1.20 1.72 1.66 1.44 0.52∗∗ −0.22∗∗ (−13.3%)
Sweden 1.62 1.70 1.61 1.55 0.08∗∗ −0.07∗∗ (−4.1%)
Australia 0.64 1.03 0.73 0.60 0.38∗∗ −0.12∗∗ (−16.8%)
New Zealand 0.95 1.43 1.56 1.52 0.49∗∗ −0.04∗∗ (−2.4%)
IT5−G3 (G2) 0.24∗∗ −0.10∗∗ ...
Notes:
a. For New Zealand, the sample period starts from 1976Q1 in column (1).
b. For Germany, the sample period ends at 1998Q4 in column (3).
c. target refers to the dates of adopting the inﬂation-targeting policy framework indicated in
Figure 2. For the G3, target is deﬁned as 1992Q4.
d. “**” in Columns (5) and (6) denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
e. The ﬁgures in parentheses in column (7) are the rate of change from column (3) to (4).
policy. In contrast, the falls in activism in Sweden and New Zealand have been subdued.
Table 1 conﬁrms the above points by calculating the average level of activism across diﬀerent
sample periods. These sample periods broadly correspond to (1) the 1970s, when inﬂation was
at a high level in many countries; (2) the preinﬂation-target periods from the beginning of the
1980s, when most central banks raised their degree of activism; (3) the posttarget periods in the
1990s; for the G3 central banks (nontargeters), the posttargeting period is deﬁned as starting at
the mean of the start dates for sample targeters, which is 1992Q2; and (4) the periods after 2000.
Compared with the 1970s, activism increased in the pretargeting periods as indicated in column (5).
That these increases are statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero indicates the time variance
of activism. Activism declined after 2000 in all of the inﬂation-targeting countries (columns (6)
and (7)). These declines are particularly noticeable in the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia
compared with Sweden and New Zealand.
9Table 2: Activism in pre- and posttargeting regimes (existing studies)
Neumann & von Hagen Kuttner & Posen
pretarget → posttarget pretarget → posttarget
United Kingdom 0.54 → 1.09 1.64 → 0.52
Canada 0.78 → −0.56 1.29 → −0.75
Sweden 0.49 → 1.32 ...
Australia 0.21 → 0.55 ...
New Zealand 0.79 → 0.88 1.02 → 1.55
Note: Activism calculated from split sample OLS of it = β0+β1πt−1+β2xt+β3xt−1+
β4it−1+ut, in Table 3 of Neumann and von Hagen (2002); and it = β0+β1πt+
β2xt + β3it−1 + ut, in Tables 3, 5, 7 of Kuttner and Posen (1999).
The last row of Table 1 indicates the diﬀerence in changes in activism between the G38 and
the inﬂation-targeting central banks. These ﬁgures plot coeﬃcient a1 in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
regression such as:
(Changes in activism)it = a0 + a1Di + uit,
where an inﬂation-targeting dummy Di takes the value 1 if country i is a targeter, and 0 otherwise.
With a caveat of a small number of nontargeters, the regression suggests that the inﬂation-targeting
central banks increased activism more than the G3 central banks in the 1980s, while they reduced
activism by a relatively large margin after 2000.
The observation of a greater degree of activism before the adoption of the new policy framework
and declining activism thereafter cannot be seen in the split sample estimations of existing studies
(Table 2). The TVP-SV model enables us to see changes in central banks’ behaviors within pre-
and posttarget periods. In addition, we also note that our estimates of activism are generally
higher than those in the table. As these studies only use actual inﬂation rates, this may well be an
indication of an error-in-variable problem in that actual rather than forecast inﬂation is likely to
bias the coeﬃcient downward (see Orphanides (2001) and Mishkin (2002)).
8The United States and Japan for column (6).
103.2 Robustness checks
The inference presented on policy responsiveness to inﬂation relies on the inference in the ﬁrst step
of the procedure: the estimation of the time-varying VAR to construct an expected inﬂation series
Etπt+1 and the output gap series Etxt+1.9 To check the robustness of the above ﬁndings, we use
an alternative speciﬁcation to obtain expected inﬂation.
Following Muscatelli et al. (2002), we use an unobserved component model as an alternative
form of forecasting inﬂation. The inﬂation rate πt is decomposed into the underlying level µt and
a random white noise error term ξt as:
πt = µt + ξt, ξt ∼ NID(0,σ2
ξ)
µt = µt−1 + ζt. ζt ∼ NID(0,σ2
ζ)
The model is equivalent to an ARIMA(0,1,1), whose forecast performance dominates other models
of the US consumer prices inﬂation rate (Stock and Watson, 2007). Expected inﬂation Etπt+1 is
set as the latest estimate of the underlying inﬂation rate ˆ µt.10
Figure 3 shows the activism indicators of inﬂation-targeting countries based on this alternative
inﬂation expectation speciﬁcation. Except for Canada, whose activism shifts downward and begins
to decline earlier, the main points of the above ﬁndings remain reasonably intact. Namely, (i) the
increases in activism took place before the adoption of the inﬂation-targeting policy framework;
and (ii) activism declined somewhat after the adoption, while it has remained relatively high in
some countries.
The ﬁnding that inﬂation-targeting central banks had changed their behaviors before their an-
nouncement of the regime changes accords closely with the historical account that “...most inﬂation-
targeting countries have chosen to adopt the new regime only after having had some initial success
in lowering inﬂation from previously high levels... [O]ne of the main beneﬁts of inﬂation targets
is that they may help to ‘lock in’ earlier disinﬂationary gains.” (Bernanke et al. 1999, p. 288)
9The importance of the ﬁrst step in the estimation is stressed as the weak instrument or the weak identiﬁcation
problem by Mavroeidis (2004) in the context of the GMM estimation.
10The unobserved component model is estimated by SsfPack 2.2 (Koopman et al., 1999).
11Figure 3: Activism indicator before and after the adoption of IT (Alternative)














Note: Activism indicators of inﬂation-targeting countries based on forecasts by the unob-
served component model. Zero corresponds to the timing of the adoption of the
inﬂation-targeting policy framework: i.e., 1992Q4 (GBR), 1991Q1 (CAN), 1993Q1
(SWE), 1994Q3 (AUS) and 1990Q1 (NZL).
For example, the Bank of England (BOE) tightened its monetary policy very sharply in the early
1980s and the late 1980s to bring inﬂation in check. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ)
succeeded in bringing underlying inﬂation down from almost 17% at the beginning of 1985 to the
vicinity of 5% at the timing of the signing of the Policy Targeting Agreement and thus setting
up the inﬂation-targeting policy framework. The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) also raised
its interest rate considerably in the 1980s and the disinﬂation was largely complete by the end of
1991, although the RBA made no public commitment to a nominal target until 1994. The Bank
of Canada (BOC) raised the overnight rate to 20% in the early 1980s and halved the inﬂation rate
from its two-digit level.
In contrast, the ﬁnding that activism had declined (but not much in some countries) after the
regime changes has rarely been mentioned in the literature. The apparently diﬃcult to interpret
12negative values of Canadian activism aside, sample split estimations in Table 2 point to higher ac-
tivism during the posttarget period except for the United Kingdom in Kuttner and Posen (1999).11
Rolling regressions by Muscatelli et al. (2002) indicate that activism of all inﬂation-targeting coun-
tries examined in their paper increased toward the end of their sample period (1999Q2). We try to
interpret why activism has declined (but not much in some countries) in terms of the constraints
of an inﬂation target range in the following sections.
4 Roles of Inﬂation Target Range
Announcement of a numerical target of inﬂation is often associated with the corresponding target
range. For instance, the BOE is required to keep inﬂation within one percentage point of either
side of the target inﬂation, and if missed, the Governor must write an open letter to the Chancellor
explaining the reasons behind it and the prospect of recovering the target range. In fact, all of
the inﬂation-targeting central banks examined in this paper have set up inﬂation target ranges as
their reference for monetary policy and their inﬂation reports often indicate, implicitly or explicitly,
target ranges in order to evaluate actual and/or projected values of inﬂation.
However, with a few exceptions such as Mishkin and Westelius (2006), the roles of a target
range have not been paid much attention in the existing literature (e.g., Svensson (1999, 2000)
and Svensson and Woodford (2005)). In this section, we develop a formal theoretical model within
the New Keynesian framework and derive the optimal interest rate rules with a target range. The
model sheds light on the roles of an inﬂation target range, which turns out to be a key to understand
the declining activism in some countries observed above.
4.1 The model
We use a family of the models developed by Woodford (2003). He proposes the aggregate-supply
relation with inﬂation inertia by assuming that individual prices are indexed to an aggregate price
index. Formally, the economy outside the central bank is represented by two equations: an “IS
11Kuttner and Posen (1999) attribute the smaller coeﬃcient of the UK to either a move away from conservatism
or an artifact of the reduction in inﬂation persistence.
13curve” and a “hybrid Phillips curve”:
xt = Etxt+1 − σ [(it − Etπt+1) − rn
t ], (8)
πt = κxt + β(1 − µ)Etπt+1 + µπt−1 + ut. (9)
Equation (8) represents the forward-looking IS curve. This IS curve states that the output gap in
period t, denoted by xt, is determined by the expected value of the output gap in period t+1 and
the deviation of the short-term real interest rate, the nominal interest rate it minus the expected
rate of inﬂation Etπt+1, from the natural rate of interest in period t, denoted by rn
t . Equation
(9) is a hybrid Phillips curve. This Phillips curve states that inﬂation in period t depends on the
expected rate of future inﬂation in period t + 1, the past inﬂation rate in period t − 1 and the
output gap in period t. σ, κ, µ, and β are parameters, satisfying σ > 0, κ > 0, 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1, and
0 < β < 1. When µ is zero, the model is purely forward-looking. The shocks to the economy occur
from rn
t and ut. We assume that all shocks in this paper are deterministic shocks.12
We assume that the central bank’s policy instrument is the short-term nominal interest rate.










t + λi(it − i∗)2, (10)
12This assumption is not trivial, but it does not change the qualitative results from the theoretical insights.
14where λπ, λx and λi are positive parameters.13 The ﬁrst term of the objective function can be
interpreted as a restriction arising from the target inﬂation, which is assumed to be zero.14
4.2 Optimal interest rate rule with inﬂation target range
We derive the optimal interest rate rule on the assumption that the central bank is able to use
commitment in a timeless perspective. Commitment implies that the conduct of monetary policy
becomes forward-looking and the central bank takes account of the eﬀects of its monetary policy
decision on expected values of the future economic variables. We think that the inﬂation-targeting
policy is characterized as a commitment rule rather than a discretionary policy in the light of its
forward-looking nature. The publication of key macroeconomic conditions based on its interest rate
projections currently done by the RBNZ, the Norwegian Central Bank and the Swedish Riksbank
bodes well for our presumption.
To take into account the role of the inﬂation target range, we impose the following restriction:
π ≤ πt ≤ ¯ π. (11)
Modeling the inﬂation target range as a constraint on inﬂation in the central bank’s optimization
problems may be seen as omitting a sense of reality. No central banks commit themselves to a
target range as strict as the above range. Some may take the range merely as an indicative band
surrounding the target inﬂation rate. The time horizon of delivering inﬂation within the range may
be too long for them to restrict their behaviors in the way implied by the inequality constraint.
13Woodford (2003, Ch.6) shows that a theoretical loss function in the presence of the hybrid Phillips curve becomes:
Lt = λπ(πt − γπt−1)
2 + λxx
2
t + λi(it − i
∗)
2,
where γ is the degree of indexation to the lagged price index. For this derivation, instead of equation (9), he uses
the following Phillips curve, which is an exact form corresponding to his microfounded setup:
πt − γπt−1 = κxt + βEt(πt+1 − γπt) + εt.
However, neither using the quadratic deviation of inﬂation from the zero targeting π
2
t instead of a change in inﬂation
(πt − γπt−1)
2 nor using the above Phillips curve instead of (9) alters the theoretical implications of this paper, such
as the choice of the terms included in the estimated Taylor rule (1).
14As shown in Giannoni and Woodford (2005), the objective function that includes other additional terms such as
the output gap and the nominal interest rate can be deﬁned as representing ﬂexible inﬂation targeting. Giannoni
(2000) and Woodford (2003) show that the last term is included in the objective function because of the monetary
frictions. We use this term to derive an optimal monetary policy rule below.
15However, even if we assume a softer range that permits some deviations from the target range, as
long as the soft range has some restrictive eﬀects on monetary policy at the time of deviation, the
qualitative outcomes in a setting of a soft range are similar to those in a setting of a hard range.
Then we can derive the following optimal interest rate with commitment in a timeless perspec-
tive (Appendix B.1):
(1 − η1L)(1 − η2L)(1 − η3F)(it − i∗) =
κλπψη3πt + λxψη3(−βµxt+1 + xt − (1 − µ)xt−1) + ψ∗φ3t − ψ∗φ4t, (12)
where φ3 and φ4 represent the Lagrange multipliers associated with the upper and the lower bound
on the inﬂation target range, respectively. L and F are the lag and the forward operators. ψ∗ =
κψ > 0. Transformation of equation (12) yields the following formula, which corresponds to
equation (2) above:
it = η1it−1 + (1 − η2L)−1(1 − η3F)−1ft + (1 − η2L)−1(1 − η3F)−1ψ∗φ3t
−(1 − η2L)−1(1 − η3F)−1ψ∗φ4t + (1 − η1)i∗, (13)
where ft ≡ κλπψη3πt + λxψη3(−βµxt+1 + xt − (1 − µ)xt−1), which we call the fundamental factor.
On top of that, equation (13) involves the Lagrange multipliers, φ3t and φ4t, which we call the
adjustment factor. When inﬂation hits the target range, either of these terms becomes positive,
which changes the elasticity of the interest rate to inﬂation.15 Moreover, because the adjustment
factor is multiplied by the forward operator, (1 − η3F)−1, and the lag operator, (1 − η2L)−1,
the central bank is required to react to the binding constraint of the inﬂation target range both
preemptively and history dependently. In other words, the central bank needs to continue to tighten
or ease the monetary policy sometime before and after inﬂation hits the upper or lower bound. This
implies that the observed interest rate elasticity to inﬂation is time varying, even if the coeﬃcient
on inﬂation in the fundamental factor ft is constant: depending on the lead and lag structure of
15In this sense, the Lagrange multipliers express the elasticity of the interest rate to speciﬁc inﬂation, π and ¯ π.
16Figure 4: Activism and shocks
Time
Interest rate path by the fundamental factor
Interest rate path by the fundamental factor + the adjustment factor
the adjustment factor and the timing when the constraint becomes binding (i.e., either φ3t or φ4t
becomes positive), the observed elasticity may deviate from that implied by the fundamental factor.
In the case that we do not assume the inﬂation target range, both φ3t and φ4t are always zero and
thus the elasticity becomes time invariant, unless we assume a change in parameters such as the
weight on inﬂation in the central bank’s loss function λπ.
The model suggests that the monetary policy activism takes the higher value as long as the
central bank sees the possibility of the binding constraint of inﬂation. The situation is illustrated by
Figure 4, where the simple positive inﬂationary shocks occur during the sequential T periods, which
lead to hump-shaped dynamics of inﬂation hitting the upper bound of a target range (see Appendix
B.2). In this case, the whole sequence of elasticity of the interest rate to inﬂation increases because
of a positive value of the adjustment factor.16
17Table 3: Activism when underlying inﬂation is outside/inside the range
Outside Inside Diﬀerence
United Kingdom NA 1.84 NA
(0) (49)
Canada 1.73 1.56 0.18∗∗
(7) (50)
Sweden 1.59 1.60 −0.01
(19) (33)
Australia 0.67 0.65 0.03
(25) (21)
New Zealand 1.58 1.53 0.04∗∗
(25) (39)
Notes:
a. Average of activism when underlying inﬂation is outside/inside the target range.
b. Figures in parentheses are the number of quarters. “**” denotes statistical signiﬁ-
cance at the 1% level.
c. Underlying inﬂation is measured by the retail price index excluding mortgage in-
terest payments (GBR); CPI excluding eight volatile components and the eﬀect
of changes in indirect taxes on the remaining components (CAN); CPI excluding
household mortgage interest expenditure and the eﬀects of changes in indirect taxes
and subsidies (SWE); CPI excluding volatile items (fruit, vegetables and automobile
fuel) (AUS); CPI excluding credit services (NZL).
185 Interpretation
5.1 Has the target range mattered?
To assess the empirical plausibility of the above theoretical model, Table 3 compares average values
of the activism indicators when underlying inﬂation is within and outside the speciﬁed target range.
When inﬂation falls outside the target range, activism tends to take statistically higher values
in Canada and New Zealand, although the diﬀerences in activism are not signiﬁcant in Sweden
and Australia. These higher values of the activism indicators are consistent with the theoretical
prediction in the case of simple shocks. At the same time, we agree that we cannot read too much
into this result as the above comparison relies on a simple assumption that the central bank judges
the risk of breaching the inﬂation target range solely by whether or not underlying inﬂation is
within the range. As we will discuss below, the Riksbank may have kept activism high even when
underlying inﬂation was inside the target range as it perceived the risk of breaching the target
range was high. We will also discuss below the case of Australia.
Figure 5 cross plots activism and the underlying inﬂation rate, the latter of which is converted
to the deviation from the midpoint of the range and scaled by the border of the target range. When
the horizontal axis is below unity (i.e., underlying inﬂation is within the target range), there is no
clear relationship between activism and inﬂation as most evident for the United Kingdom. The
observation is in line with the theoretical model, which predicts no correlation between activism
and inﬂation in the absence of the adjustment factor. When the horizontal axis exceeds unity, there
is a clear indication that activism tends to take higher values, at least in Canada and New Zealand.
5.2 Why has activism declined?
The above theoretical model suggests that there exist at least two cases in which monetary policy
activism declined after the adoption of the inﬂation-targeting policy framework.
16The model predicts that the elasticity of the interest rate to inﬂation may decline at some point in time if the
economy is hit by a series of positive and negative shocks and inﬂation sequentially reaches the upper and the lower
bounds of a target range. However, we do not pursue this case in the following analysis given the unlikelihood of this
occurring. Reading their inﬂation reports, it is diﬃcult to imagine that the inﬂation-targeting central banks foresee
such complicated shocks.
19Figure 5: Activism and inﬂation























Note: The vertical axis is activism, while the horizontal axis is the underlying inﬂation rate.
The underlying inﬂation is converted to the deviation from the middle of the target
range and divided by one side of the target range so that it corresponds to the border:
(π − 0.5(¯ π + π))/0.5(¯ π − π).
20Case A: The central bank has reduced the relative weight attached to inﬂation variability in its
loss function, λπ in equation (10).
Case B: The central bank raised monetary policy activism on one occasion, because it foresees
a great risk that inﬂation may fall outside the range (Figure 4). However, once inﬂation has become
well contained, the central bank has reduced activism, as it has not faced the binding constraint.
Although we do not deny entirely its possibility, it is rather diﬃcult to believe that inﬂation-
targeting central banks reduce their preference for inﬂation stability (Case A). Therefore, we think
Case B is the more compelling. A higher degree of accountability and transparency as well as
independence in the conduct of monetary policy are likely to prevent a central bank from softening
its policy stance. On the other hand, it is not hard to imagine that the inﬂation-targeting cen-
tral banks foresaw a greater risk of breaching the target range and raised their monetary policy
activism accordingly, given that inﬂation was still high around the time of the introduction of an
inﬂation-targeting policy (Figure 6). After establishing successful records of inﬂation and contain-
ing inﬂation expectations, these central banks can gradually reduce their activism because of the
lower probability of inﬂation falling outside the range. Their successful records may have been
achieved through greater credibility of monetary policy stemming from a higher degree of activism
even before the adoption of the inﬂation-targeting framework (the good policy hypothesis). At
the same time, as extensively discussed in the literature (see Melick and Galati (2006) and White
(2008)), factors attributable to good luck and those attributable to changes in the structure of the
economy may also have worked.
Figure 6 also indicates why activism has declined in the United Kingdom and Canada, but
not much in Sweden and New Zealand. Underlying inﬂation in the former two countries remained
remarkably within the target ranges compared with the latter two. This left some room for the
BOE and the BOC to reduce activism, while the Swedish Riksbank and the RBNZ had to remain
vigilant. For example, the Riksbank eased monetary policy in 1997 in response to inﬂation that
hit the lower band. The RBNZ, whose Governor may be subject to dismissal after any breach,
raised the overnight cash interest rate from about 4% to 10% around the middle of the 1990s, when
21Figure 6: Inﬂation target ranges
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Note: Inﬂation rates measured as annual changes, in percentages. Dotted lines indicate inﬂation
target ranges. Underlying inﬂation is measured by the retail price index excluding mortgage
interest payments (GBR); CPI excluding eight volatile components and the eﬀect of changes
in indirect taxes on the remaining components (CAN); CPI excluding household mortgage
interest expenditure and the eﬀects of changes in indirect taxes and subsidies (SWE); CPI
excluding volatile items (fruit, vegetables and automobile fuel) (AUS); CPI excluding credit
services (NZL).
22inﬂation overshot the target range.
Australia also breached the target range several times including at the time of the VAT rate
hike in 2000. That activism in Australia has declined might be because the RBA has declared
the upper and lower bounds to be an indicative “thick point” inﬂation target rather than a target
range. In such an environment, the RBA does not have a strong incentive to keep the inﬂation rate
within a target range.
6 Conclusion
When and how did inﬂation-targeting central banks change their behaviors? Evidence in this
paper suggests that most of them had gone through a substantial change toward a higher response
of the interest rate to inﬂation even before their announcement of numerical targets. Along with
Muscatelli et al. (2002), this can be taken as a statistical complement to the careful historical
investigation done by Bernanke et al. (1999), who highlight a tactical policy decision that these
central banks prefer to adopt the new regime only after they can meet the initial inﬂation targets
with high probability.
The paper also ﬁnds that, after the introduction of the inﬂation-targeting policy framework,
responsiveness of the interest rate to inﬂation declined, while it has remained relatively high for
some central banks. A theoretical model, which explicitly takes into account an inﬂation target
range, suggests that the decline in monetary policy activism is in fact because of the successful
inﬂation records of these central banks rather than a genuine change in their preference for inﬂation
stability. The conjecture goes as follows: because of their success in keeping inﬂation within the
target ranges, their credibility has improved and inﬂation expectations have become well contained.
This in turn has reduced the need for high policy activism, as the probability of breaching target
ranges has diminished.
We are tempted to call the recent decline in activism the “credibility gain” of these inﬂation-
targeting central banks, but we admit that the evidence in this paper is a mere indicator of this
story, as we have not estimated an identiﬁed structural model. Further analyses appear highly
23warranted. These may include estimating nonlinear reactions of the interest rates depending on
whether or not inﬂation is likely to hit a target range.
24Appendix A: Algorithm for the TVP-SV model
Because a detailed description of the algorithm is already available elsewhere (Sekine, 2006), we
only provide an outline in this appendix.
Our objective is to obtain a posterior density of an entire model represented by the state space
form of (3)-(7):
p(β1,...,βt,B,B0,h0,...,ht,H,H0,c|i,Z).
This is achieved by running the following Gibbs sampler for 21,000 replications, with 1,000 burn-in
replications discarded and 20,000 replications retained.17
1. Initialize B,B0,h,H,H0 and c = logγ2.
2. Sample β from β|y,B,B0,h using the simulation smoother of de Jong and Shephard (1995).
3. Sample B and B0 from B|β and B0|β, respectively.
4. Sample h from h|y,β,H,H0,c using the method of Kim et al. (1998).
5. Sample H and H0 from H|h and H0|h, respectively.
6. Sample c from c|y,β,h.
7. Go to 2.
We assume the following conjugate prior distributions (underline denotes prior parameters of
these densities):
B|β Wishart: p(Λ) = fW(Λ|νΛ,Λ) where νΛ = 1 and νΛ = 10−5 × Ip
B0|β Gamma: p(λ0i) = fG(λ0i|s−2
λ0i,νλ0i) where s−2
λ0i = 1 and νλ0i = 1
H|h Gamma: p(ρi) = fG(ρi|s−2
ρi ,νρi) where s−2
ρi = 1 and νρi) = 1
H0|h Gamma: p(ρ0i) = fG(ρ0i|s−2
ρ0i,νρ0i) where s−2
ρ0i = 100 and νρ0i = 1
c|y,β,h Normal: p(c) = fN(c|c,V ) where c = 1 and V = 1
17All the codes are written in Ox (Doornik, 2006).
25Appendix B: Optimization under commitment
B.1 Optimization with inﬂation target range
The optimal monetary policy with a restriction of an additionally speciﬁed permitted inﬂation





βt {Lt − 2φ1t [xt+1 − σ(it − πt+1 − rn






βt {−2φ3t [¯ π − πt] − 2φ4t [πt − π]}
}
,
where φ1, φ2, φ3 and φ4 represent the Lagrange multipliers associated with the IS constraint, the
Phillips curve constraint, the upper bound on the inﬂation target range and the lower bound on the
inﬂation target range, respectively. We diﬀerentiate the Lagrangian with respect to πt, xt, and it
under the restriction on the inﬂation target range, π ≤ πt ≤ ¯ π, to obtain the ﬁrst-order conditions:
λππt − β−1σφ1t−1 − βµφ2t+1 + φ2t − (1 − µ)φ2t−1 + φ3t − φ4t = 0, (B.1)
λxxt + φ1t − β−1φ1t−1 − κφ2t = 0, (B.2)
λi(it − i∗) + σφ1t = 0, (B.3)
φ3t(¯ π − πt) = 0, (B.4)
φ3t ≥ 0, (B.5)
¯ π − πt ≥ 0, (B.6)
φ4t(πt − π) = 0, (B.7)
φ4t ≥ 0, (B.8)
26πt − π ≥ 0. (B.9)
Equations (B.4) to (B.9) are conditions for the restriction on the inﬂation target range. The
above nine conditions, together with the IS (equation (8)) and Phillips (equation (9)) equations,
are the conditions governing the loss minimization. In other words, the sequence of interest rates
determined by these conditions is the optimal interest rate setting at each time under the restriction
on the inﬂation target range and the target inﬂation. When the constraints of the inﬂation target
range are not binding (i.e., π < πt < ¯ π), the Lagrange multiplier, φ3t and φ4t, becomes zero by
the Kuhn–Tucker condition, and then the interest rate is determined by the conditions given by
equations (8), (9), (B.1), (B.2) and (B.3) with φ3t = 0 and φ4t = 0. When the restriction on the
inﬂation target range is binding (i.e., π = πt or ¯ π = πt), the interest rate is adjusted according to
the positive values of φ3t and φ4t. It should be noted that the expectation operator, Et, does not
appear in these equations because the future paths of shocks are perfectly foreseen thanks to the
assumption of deterministic shocks.
To demonstrate the point mentioned above simply, we can show the optimal interest rate rule
by the loss minimization conditions above:18
(1 − η1L)(1 − η2L)(1 − η3F)(it − i∗) =
κλπψη3πt + λxψη3(−βµxt+1 + xt − (1 − µ)xt−1) + ψ∗φ3t − ψ∗φ4t, (B.10)
where ψ∗ = κψ > 0, η1η2η−1
3 = ψλi(1 − µ)(βσ)−1, η1η2 + η1η−1
3 + η2η−1
3 = ψλi(1 + µ)σ−1,
η1+η2+η−1
3 = ψλi(βσ)−1(σκ+1+(1−µ)β), and η3 = η−1
4 (η2 > 1 > η1 > 0 and η4 > 1 > η3 > 0).
Thus we can conﬁrm that when the restriction on the inﬂation target range is binding, the interest
18Here the optimal monetary policy is only valid under a deterministic shock process, because certainty equivalence
does not hold when control variables are nonlinearly constrained. It is impossible to obtain optimal monetary policy
in an analytical form under a stochastic environment.
27rate, it, is adjusted according to the positive values of φ3t and φ4t. More speciﬁcally, when the
upper inﬂation bound is binding, the optimal monetary policy rule holds a bias to set the interest
rates higher according to the positive value of the upper inﬂation bound indicator, φ3t. Instead of
the positive value of φ3t, πt = ¯ π should hold. On the other hand, when the lower inﬂation bound
is binding, the optimal monetary policy rule has a bias to set the interest rates lower according to
the lower inﬂation bound indicator, φ4t.
B.2 Activism
An impact of the inﬂation range on activism (i.e., elasticity of the interest rate to inﬂation) can be
analytically derived as follows. As shown in Figure 4, in the case of the simple positive inﬂationary
shocks, which lead to hump-shaped inﬂation dynamics hitting the upper or lower bound of a
target range for the sequential T periods, the whole sequence of elasticities of the interest rate to
inﬂation increases because of a positive value of the adjustment factor. We can demonstrate it by
transforming equation (B.10) as:
(1 − η1L)(1 − η2L)(1 − η3F)(it − i∗) =
κλπψη3(πt + ψ∗∗φ3t − ψ∗∗φ4t) + λxψη3(−βµxt+1 + xt − (1 − µ)xt−1), (B.11)
where we assume that inﬂation hits the upper bound (φ3t > 0 and φ4t = 0) and ψ∗∗ = ψ∗(κλπψη3)−1 >
0. In this case, positive φ3t always raises the responsiveness of the interest rate, and so the whole
sequence of elasticities of the interest rate to inﬂation increases.
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